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Abstract 
Based on interview and questionnaire data obtained from 
over 100 ·executives from u.s.-based corporations, this paper discusses the process by which partners have been selected 
for joint ventures (JVs). The paper begins by briefly 
highlighting the importance of the partner selection topic, 
arguing that potential long term compatibility deserves 
increased emphasis when selecting JV partners. Several 
selection criteria related to compatibility are identified 
and discussed, using numerous illustrations from actual 
ventures. The paper then outlines the partner selection 
process, including discussion of the key individuals who are 
involved, how contacts are initiated with prospective 
partners, what the role of top management is, and where and by whom final decisions are made. The paper concludes by 
noting that JVs are typically characterized by on-going 
negotiations, suggesting that it may be unwise for managers 
to approach the process with a zero-sum game mentality. 
In light of the recent groundswell of interest in JVs 
and other forms of interfirm collaboration, it is expected 
that this paper will be of interest to managers and 
academics from both descriptive and normative standpoints. 
SELECTING JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS IS 
EASY ... ALMOSTl 
A small technology company, let's call them Alpha Corporation, 
developed an advanced design for a computer peripheral. Laoking the 
manufacturing and marketing acumen, as well as the financial muscle, necessary 
to rapidly commercialize this breakthrough, Alpha's managers decided to seek 
assistance via a joint venture (JV). They approached several firms and, after 
spending much time in analyzing the technical compatibility between their own 
and their prospective partners' companies, agreed to venture with one of the 
dominant firms in the industry. They announced their decision amidst great 
fanfare--press releases, a company-wide celebration, champagne. Analysts 
lauded the decision and predicted spectacular results. Alpha's stock nearly 
doubled in value. 
Another success story from the Silicon Valley, right? Wrong! Within a year 
the venture had been dissolved, Alpha's stock price had tumbled, and the 
executives who helped set up the venture had departed for greener pastures. 
What had happened? According to the survivors of this debacle, the JV 
confronted problems almost from Day One. Because of differences in the 
partners' sizes and management styles, venture teams constantly oomplained of 
an inability to work together. Managers from Alpha, used to making quick 
decisions and then acting upon them, were frustrated by the slow moving 
bureaucracy of their larger partner. Alpha's designs were repeatedly, and their 
employees thought unnecessarily, subjected to modifications by the partner's 
researchers. Product introduction was delayed by several months when the 
partner unexpectedly transferred several critical personnel to another project. 
Complaints to the partner's headquarters frequently appeared to be ignored. 
The venture was ultimately terminated at significant financial cost to both 
partners. To make matters worse, the delays enabled one of Alpha's 
competitors to beat them to the market with a similar product 
1The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the Edna Benson Foundation, Touche-Ross, 
and the participating executives. Their assistance made this artide possible. 
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Alpha's managers did not adequately consider the difterences between 
selecting a partner with compatible skills and selecting a compatible partner. 
They wanted to establish a venture which would achieve corporate objectives, 
but this meant different things to the two companies. The Alpha Corporation 
example is especially insightful because a surprising number of managers do 
not probe deeply enough into the issue of compatibility between their own and 
their prospective partners' companies. They want very muoh to believe that they 
are building a lasting relationship with their partners--but they're not. 
Establishing a lasting JV relationship is a complex process, and the degree of 
compatibility between partners is but one variable influencing that process. Yet, 
although selecting a compatible partner may not always result in a long-lived and 
successful joint venture, selection of an incompatible partner virtually guarantees 
that the venture's performance will be unsatisfactory. 
Previous studies have devoted most of their attention to motivations for 
forming a joint venture, as well as managing the venture once it has been 
established. In contrast, this article and the research project on which It is based 
(see insert) emphasize the process of seleoting joint venture partners. The 
discussion which follows is based primarily on a series of interviews with 
corporate executives regarding the joint venture experiences of their companies. 
These executives, mo-st of whom occupied positions at senior levels of their 
management hierarchies, had been intimately involved in the prooess of 
identifying and selecting partners for one or more JVs. This article desoribes 
how executiv~s perceive the partner selection process, with some emphasis on 
how prospective partners are identified, what criteria may be employed when 
evaluating a company"s suitability as a partner, and who is typically Involved in 
the selection process. 
IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING OF PARTNERS 
Finding and courting a partner for a joint venture can be an expensive 
process. Costs are not limited to negotiating and writing the legal and operating 
agreements. Substantial amounts of time and other resources frequently must 
be expended In identifying and screening prospeotive partners prior to the 
venture's formation. This is particularly imperative when the company's 
management has only limited prior experience with the proposed venture's 
products or markets, although the costs can be substantial even if managers 
already have a thorougtt knowledge of the venture's industry. 
Onsert) 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This article is based on a research project that explored U.S.-based 
companies' experiences in selecting partners for joint ventures. In his fieldwork, 
the author examined the process by which managers identified, evaluated, and 
selected prospective partners. To insure spontaneity and openness in 
responses, anonymity was guaranteed for all participants and their companies. 
Data was collected on numerous topics, including what partner 
characteristics were most actively sought--and avoided; how initial contacts 
were made with prospective partners; which managers were involved in partner 
identification and evaluation, and what roles they assumed; and how and by 
whom decisions were made regarding whether, and with whom, to form a joint 
venture. 
The .author conducted extensive, generally multihour, interviews with over 
1 00 managers who had been intimately involved in selecting partners tor over 
250 joint ventures from a wide range of industries. The majority of the ventures 
had target markets which included at least one of the industrialized nations. 
Nevertheless, based on comments by the participants, most of the findings 
should also apply to joint ventures which were not principally oriented toward 
serving developed country markets. 
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Despite its importance, managers may hesitate to devote a significant 
amount of corporate resources to the process of identifying and evaluating an 
extensive list of viable partner prospects. This is particularly the case when a 
partner with the mininum basic technical requirements appears to have been 
found--through an introduction at a convention or trade show, a comment from a 
colleague, or some other means. Often, partners appear to have been chosen 
for reasons not fully relevant to the organization's objectives and without a 
stringent comparison of alternatives. Many JV partners seem to have been 
selected almost by accident, or at least without full consideration of how they 
might influence the JV's operations. This tendency to abbreviate partner 
selection efforts may help account for the widespread perception that Joint 
ventures tend to be fraught with problems, including inferior performance, and 
that they commonly Oifail" within a relatively short period of time. 
PARTNER IDENTIFICATION REQUIRES RESEARCH 
As with many other aspects of .N formation, identification of viable partner 
prospects is a research task. Managers need to be aware of their firm's 
strengths and limitations before taking the first step In searching for prospective 
partners. At a minimum, partners should be able to provide the additional 
capabilities which, in both the short and the longer-term, are necessary to enable 
the venture to be competitive. This means that a manager must analyze the 
venture's antioipated target market, as well as the businesses which prospective 
partners are currently in or likely to enter in the relatively near future, in order to 
identify possible synergies. However, unless a manager has a thorough 
knowledge of the venture's industry and the potential players, n~liance on 
superficial scanning efforts is unlikely to result in an optimal partner selection 
decision. Particularly for fast-moving technologies, such as 
telecommunications, biotechnology, or robotics, managers should be cautious 
about making assumptions regarding other firms• capabilities. Reputations may 
be misleading, and many an executive has felt blind-sided when he belatedly 
discovered that a partner did not have the skills necessary for the JV's success. 
When identifying partners, there is no single approach whioh will be 
preferable in all situations. The evaluation must consider such factors as the 
peculiar characteristics of the industry, your firm's competitive position, and the 
venture's anticipated requirements for capital and other resources. Typically, 
among the first potential partners to be considered are the distributors, suppliers, 
and customers for the industry of the proposed venture. Yet, even these 
companies must be examined to see which ones are available for venturing and 
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which might be preempted from participation due to prior agreements with 
oompetitors or similar reasons. 
Of course, extensive search and screening efforts are not always a 
feasible option. Sometimes, the nature of the proposed investment dictates that 
the range of prospective partners is limited. For instance, there may be only one 
firm with access to the technology or raw materials needed by the JV. In other 
oases, government fiat or regulations regarding foreign ownership may sharply 
limit the number of available partner prospects. However, even if only one or a 
few viable partner prospects are perceived to exist, this does not diminish the 
importance of screening these oompanies for suitability as JV colleagues. 
Conflicts between partners are best avoided if anticipated before the venture is 
established, so extreme care should be taken in selecting the other party, or 
parties. The additional effort you expend up-front in selecting the ••right" partner 
may repay itself many times over in avoided costs of misunderstandings, delays, 
and divorce. 
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING PARTNERS 
Attempting to define a set of criteria for selecting the "right" partner would 
be roughly analogous to trying to tell a person how to pick the "right" spouse--
certainly a difficult, it not an impossible, proposition. The selection of a partner 
who will be compatible in the long term is a complex and individualistic 
endeavor. Each joint venture is unique in its own way, and must be approached 
accordingly. Yet, there do seem to be common elements to many JVs. As a 
result, it might be possible to draw from the experience of other managers in 
suggesting guidelines to consider when selecting a JV partner. Several 
considerations regarding selection criteria are discussed below. 
Seek Complementary Technical Skills and Resources 
The primary selection criterion is generally a partner's ability to provide 
the technical skills and resources which complement those of your company. 
Generally, if prospective partners can not satisfy this criterion, then formation of a 
joint venture should be a questionable proposition, at best. Therefore, technical 
complementarity should be viewed as a minimum qualification for the selection 
of a partner. 
Technical complementarity is determined by analyzing the critical success 
factors--those few areas strongly influencing competitive position and 
pertormance--whioh confront the proposed venture. Once this is done, you must 
evaluate your company's current and anticipated future competitive position 
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relative to these factors. Those areas where deficiencies are perceived to exist 
can serve as the basis for assessing the technical complementarity of a partner. 
However, your analysis should identify more than merely a financial deficiency--
such resources may onen be accessed via other options which will not entail the 
extensive managerial involvement of a partner. Although it may have appeal 
initially, a JV based solely on a partner"s financial contributions is unlikely to 
foster long term compatibility. 
T eohnical complementarity can assume many forms. A oommon alliance 
consists of technology supplied by one parent and marketing and financial 
capabilities furnished by the other. For example, an American medical 
equipment company wanted to expand sales of its product line In Europe. 
However, because of its small size and limited marketing experience and name 
recognition, the company was hesitant to undertake internal efforts .at Increasing 
penetration of the European market. Therefore, it sought the assistance of a joint 
venture partner. Strategic analysis of the proposed investment suggested that, at 
a minimum, a partner would have to be a recognized player in the medical 
supplies industry and have access to a suflicient level of financial resources and 
managerial talent. The partner would also need a given minimum level of 
sophistication with the relevant technologies so that its employees could 
competently demonstrate the technical advantages of the American firm's 
products. Companies which did not satisfy this set of criteria were rejected as 
possible co-venturers. 
Seeking a partner with complementary technical skills and resources can 
permit each partner to concentrate its resources in those areas where it 
possesses the greatest relative competence, while diversifying into attraotive but 
unfamiliar business arenas. Rather than intensifying weaknesses, .Ns can thus 
be a means of creating strengths. 
Mutual Dependency: A Necessary Evil 
American managers have traditionally viewed dependenoy upon other 
companies or individuals as undesirable, and have avoided such situations 
whenever possible. However, in identifying suitable JV partner prospects, there 
should be some identifiable mutual need, with each partner supplying unique 
capabilities or resources which are viewed as critical to the venture's success. 
Proper matching should result in both partners perceiving that they have a vested 
interest in keeping the venture working, rather than resorting to some non-JV 
form of investment. By having one partner strong where the other is weak, and 
vice versa, mutual respect will be fostered and second-guessing and oonflict can 
be mitigated. 
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Prior experience suggests that there should be a .. middle level .. of 
dependency between partners. If the level of dependency is too small, then the 
JV is unlikely to survive difficult times. On the other hand, too great of a 
dependency may prove unstable because of fears of the devastating 
consequences of the loss of a partner. The latter case commonly occurs when a 
small firm forms a .N with a much larger partner. The small firm may feel 
insecure, since it would be unable to fully exploit a market opportunity by itself, or 
only at a much slower rate and at a greater risk than might be the case in a 
shared endeavor. The smaller firm tends to be hungrier, and may need the sales 
revenues from the .N more than the larger partner. In addition, as discussed 
earlier with the Alpha Corporation example, association with a prominent partner 
may cause a smaller concern's stock value to rise. This is particularly worrisome 
if later termination of the venture is perceived as attributable to a failure to 
successfully commercialize the smaller firm's technology. While the larger firm 
may emerge from the venture virtually unscathed, JV termination may severely 
disable the small firm by causing customers, ernpl('-yees, and Wall Street to 
question the firm's viability. The resulting damage to ll£" reputation may cause a 
precipitous decline in its stock value, harming morale ii.lnd limiting the available 
strategic options. 
Painful lessons regarding dependency between partners were 
experienced by many companies which, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
formed ventures with Asian firms as a means of rapidly acoessing cheap labor or 
new markets. Frequently, the American corporations contributed the initial 
technology and some of the financing, and they trained their partners in the 
intricacies of running the business. Once this was accomplished, several of the 
ventures were dissolved and the partners later used technology obtained from 
the JV as a weapon against their former U.S. allies. 
Several options are available for helping to insure that JV partners will 
continue to perceive themselves as mutually dependent. One method of 
reinforcing mutual dependence is to establish some means of "exchanging 
hostages." For instance, it is often possible to insert conditions into a JV 
agreement whereby a unilateral decision to prematurely break up the corporate 
marriage will result in a substantial charge of some sort, "alimony" payments it 
you will, as well as covenants against engaging in competing activities within a 
specified time period. It may also be possible to guarantee cross purchases of 
specified volumes of products or services by the partners. This option can help 
reduce the potentially devastating impact of a break-up upon a more-dependent 
firm by guaranteeing access to critical raw materials or sales revenues during 
the painful readjustment period. By employing techniques such as these, the 
threat posed by dependency on a partner can be reduced substantially. 
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Avoid •Anchors• 
When contemplating a JV, be sure that your prospective partner is able to 
generate the given minimum level of financial resources necessary for 
maintaining the venture's efforts. Although this minimum amount varies 
dramatically between JVs, managers frequently note their avoidance of partners 
which are likely to become ••anchors," slowing venture growth and development 
due to an inability or unwillingness to provide their share of the funding. As the 
vice president of a major manufacturing concern remarked, "Partners will almost 
always have differences of opinion regarding expansion. A small company may 
have fewer financial resources available for shouldering its portion of an 
expansion, or have to pay a higher financing rate than does the larger partner. 
This can not only cause operating problems, but may also result in some bruised 
egos, which can further intensify the difficulties." 
A partner's inability to fulfill its financial commitments, whether due to 
small size, to financial difficulties in its other operations, or to the existence of 
different discount rates and time horizons, can create turmoil for the venture and 
its managers. Particularly in the early stages of a JV, when large negative cash 
flows are more likely to be encountered, the presence of an "anchor" can 
jeopardize an entire project, forcing a premature buy-out or termination. 
Commenting on his company's experiences with a smaller firm, one senior 
executive commented that, "The joint venture was functioning_~uite smoothly and 
was meeting or surpassing both companies' projections until the financial 
demands exceeded (the other company's) capabilities •••• The resulting 
animosities ultimately caused the venture to be dissolved." 
Although it is not always possible to identify potential "anchors," several 
tell-tale signs may suggest the need for further inquiry. As one executive 
suggested, "You have to look at the partner's balance sheet and ask: 'Is it a 
financially solid company?' You have to look at their plans for growth and their 
profit orientation. Is there a difference in the strategic importance placed on the 
JV's activities? Is the partner likely to confront financial problems in one or more 
divisions? If so, what will be the effect upon other activities of the partner, 
especially the JV?" 
A prospective partner's resource constraints oan constitute a significant 
hurdle to the establishment of a successful JV. However, if proper precautions 
are observed, the presence of a partner with meager financial resources need 
not prevent JV formation or force a venture's termination. Especially when 
insufficient financial oontributions are not due to financial insolvency, it may be 
possible to reduce noncompliance with the agreement by including penalties if 
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either partner attempts to back out of the relationship or otherwise sidestep its 
financial obligations. It might also be possible to stipulate that the companies 
can not engage in similar activities for a specified period of time. Furthermore, 
the agreement might be structured to allow shareholdings or payouts to be 
contingent upon the level of each partner's contributions, thus minimizing 
perceived inequities which might result from disparities in financial contributions. 
The use of these and similar mechanisms can reduce the undesirable effects of 
an "anchor" upon JV activities. 
Relative Company Size: The Elephant and the Ant Complex 
Relative company size is often of paramount concern when evaluating a 
prospective partner. Although exceptions are numerous, joint ventures often will 
have the best chance of succeeding if both parents are comparable in 
sophistication and size, preferably large. When a small company deoides to .N 
and chooses a partner of similar size, the two companies frequently magnify 
each other's weaknesses. This is less often the case between two large firms, 
which are likely to have similar values and control systems, similar tolerances f<.tr 
losses, and similar appetites for risk. Crises are less common in large firms, 
particularly in regard to short term cash flow. Thus, larger companies typically 
offer greater "staying power, .. being able to commit a more substantial volume of 
resources over a longer time horizon. 
Yet, sometimes a venture between firms of different sizes seems 
warranted. Size differences may yield synergies for the partners. A smaller 
company with innovative technology may decide to venture with a large 
corporation with ttte financial and marketing clout necessary to commercialize 
that technology, as was the case with the Alpha Corporation example. Similarly, 
Nike, an innovative designer of athletic shoes, teamed up with Nissho lwai, 
Japan's sixth-largest trading company. And in 1978, Advanced Micro Devices, 
with $6Z million in sales, formed a joint venture with Siemens A. G., West 
Germany's largest electrical oompany, to produce a line of microoomputer 
systems and related products. 
When partners evidence significant size discrepanoies--dubbtd "the 
elephant and the ant complex .. by one executive--managers must be aware of the 
problems which may result. One frequently voiced ooncern is the possible 
domination of one company over the other, as addressed earlier during the 
discussion of mutual need. A related problem which may arise from extreme 
size discrepancies is that the different operational environments and corporate 
cultures of the partners may appear incompatible. For instance, the typically 
bureaucratic environment of many large firms, with a relatively slow decision 
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making apparatus and a voracious appetite for information gathering and 
analysis, sharply contrasts with the more entrepreneurial and quick-response 
orientation characteristic of small firms. A small business, accustomed to 
reacting within short time frames, may feel paralyzed by the seemingly glacial 
pace at which the larger company operates. Yet, the. small company's prodding 
and sense of urgency may make the larger partner nervous--a nervousness 
whioh may seem justifiable. The large company may interpret its smaller 
partner's spartan environment and informality as indicative of a fly-by-night, shoe-
string operation that may not remain in business for long. Furthermore, the 
larger firm may perceive that most or all of the risk is being borne by itself-
educating a sales force and customers about a new produors features: 
assuming responsibility for warehousing, distribution, and sometimes 
production; lending credibility to the product, along with enhancing the prestige 
and financial status of the smaller firm. As a result, the larger firm may exercise 
even greater caution in its activities, further exacerbating the problem. 
As the above suggests, differences in management style, decision making 
orientation, and perspective on time may effectively result in corporate culture 
shook, frustrating management from each partner and hindering the 
development and maintenance of good rapport. Therefore, a JV between 
companies of widely disparate sizes often necessitates the creation of a special 
environment in order to foster successful venture development For instance, it 
might be possible to reduce the effect of partner size differences upon JV 
performance by giving the venture virtually a free hand in product development or 
other activities, minimizing administrative red tape and permitting quicker 
response time. This emphasis on autonomy might be a particularly appropriate 
option when the venture's environment is characterized by rapid change, and 
slow response might be akin to a kiss of death for the JV. The willingness of a 
partner to cooperate in this effort might constitute a critical factor in the partner 
selection decision. 
Even when managers express a strong desire for working with a partner 
with a similar "systems" orientation, that need not dictate ventures between 
same-size corporations. On the contrary, the relevant measure often is not 
absolute corporate size, but the relative size of the respective business units. 
Therefore, managers may seek partners evidencing similar size at the business 
or division, rather than corporate, level. Another possibility for minimizing the 
effect of size differences is for a small firm to try to identify a large firm which is 
both hungry and has the marketing, financial, or technical muscle necessary for a 
successful venture. This may require greater diligence in identifying and 
contacting partners, however, since these are all attributes which tend to be 
found in certain individuals or business units rather than in the organization as a 
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whole. Yet, their presence helps ensure that the larger partner will be sufficiently 
aggressive to maintain respect from customers and competitors, and there is a 
greater likelihood that both partners will have similar perceptions of time as a 
vital component in the venture's success. 
Strategic Complementarity: A Prerequisite for Long Term Success 
Although partner size is an important criterion for many companies, it is 
commonly asserted that relative size is not as important as complementarity 
among the partners' strategic goals and objectives. Achieving a strategic fit 
between companies· objectives for the joint venture is neoessary for maintaining 
long-term commitment to the joint venture. From the outset of discussions, each 
partner must strive to clearly understand what the other participants desire from 
the union. As one seasoned veteran commented, "It is remarkable how many 
joint ventures are consummated where one or both partners do not otearly state 
their objectives. Under these circumstances, venture failure is almost inevitable ... 
Different objectives in forming a particular JV, including the timing and 
level of returns on their investments, frequently produoes oonflicts of interest 
between partners. For instance, one executive reflected upon a previous JV 
involving his company and an Asian firm. He noted that the venture evidenced a 
lack of strategic fit between the partners• objectives: his company sought rapid 
market access and a high rate of dividend repatriation so that its stock price 
would be maximized, enhancing an expansion strategy based on exchanges of 
stock. The partner, on the other hand, sought transfer of technology and long 
term market development, rather than rapid tinanoial returns. As a result ot these 
differences, the JV performed poorly and was abandoned within a couple of 
years. The partner was reported to have used t~e acquired technological 
expertise to expand its own market position in Asia. 
As partners• objectives diverge, there is an Increasing risk of 
dissatisfaction and associated problems. This risk may be heightened when the 
venture•s environment is characterized by a high level of uncertainty, since 
changes in a JV's operations are more likely under these circumstances. 
Unexpected events can cause problems because of the difficulty of formulating a 
mutually acceptable response to change. A power game can result, and the 
venture can collapse if the partners cannot reach an agreement on an 
appropriate course of action. 
However, divergence of corporate objectives can lead to a venture's 
downfall even if performance is satisfactory. For example, Dow-Badisohe was 
formed in 1958 as a 50/50 joint venture between Dow Chemical and BASF of 
Germany, and it achieved good profitability over much of its life. Nevertheless, 
Geringer: Seleclittg Joittt retttuTe PluiiiBTI il Ell.q ... A/mo•t 11 
despite $300 million in annual sales, the venture was ultimately dissolved. BASF 
wanted to expand the venture, but Dow was reluctant to oontribute additional 
capital since the venture's activities did not seem to fit within the firm's strategic 
focus. The gap between oorporate objectives widened to the point where BASF 
bought out Dow's shares in 1978 and transformed the venture into a wholly-
owned U.S. subsidiary. 
Although determining the objectives of a prospective partner is often 
difficult, it is an essential task nevertheless. Failure to do so may significantly 
increase the prospect of later problems. The analysis needs to address not only 
the oompany•s current situation and objectives, but also its likely future position. 
The rationale for this is that JVs frequently encounter changes in their operating 
environments, and it is essential that companies anticipate how their partner is 
likely to be affected by, and respond to, these changes. JVs only tend to work as 
long as each partner perceives that it is receiving benefits, or is likely to benefit in 
the relatively near future. Because of differences in objectives, what is good for 
one company may be a disaster for the other party. 
An executive illustrated this situation through analogy to the search for a 
spouse: one must find a mate who is likely to change in similar ways with 
changes in the environment, or the relationship is unlikely to survive. Therefore, a 
compatible partner would ideally be one with similar values and objectives, in 
both a short and a long term sense. Such a situation will enhance the ability of 
managers to interpret one another's estimates, such as sales forecasts, 
development schedules, and cost estimates. This is particularly critical as the 
strategic stakes--the size of investment, potential effect on corporate image, or 
relationship to the organization's core technologies--increase in scale. 
Evaluate Compatibility Between Partners· Operating Policies 
Another consideration when selecting a partner involves the similarity of 
partners• operating policies and procedures. Executives related several 
instances where differences between the partners• policies--such as personnel 
procedures, accounting and finance conventions, and strategic planning 
cycles--had caused significant problems for JVs. For instance, one venture was 
nearly dissolved because inconsistencies between the partners• accounting 
systems repeatedly produced disagreement regarding timing of purchases, 
allocation of costs, and so forth. Since the JV was only marginally profitable, the 
method of reconciling disagreements could determine whether or not the venture 
would appear on the parents• books as a profitable operation, an important 
consideration for the division-level management teams. Another executive 
reported that differences in vacation policies between his firm and his European 
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partner created serious difficulties for their JV because the latter company shut 
down virtually all operations for a month each summer, whereas the U.S.-based 
firm allowed employees to schedule their own vacation time. As a result, the 
venture repeatedly encountered operationally-related difficulties. 
Partners should be clear regarding the types of policies they will be 
comfortable working with. For example, a U.S. firm is typically accustomed to 
operating with a lower debt-to-equity ratio than is the case for a Japanese 
partner. These policies should be addressed thoroughly before the venture is 
formed. Differences in operating approaches may often result from cultural 
biases, and managers may not be conscious of their existence. They may take 
for granted that there is a "right" way to do certain things. · As one Japanese 
manager stated, "Many American executives attempt to force their Japanese 
partners to adopt American methods of operation, in disregard of the distribution 
structure and other financial and management methods whioh have prevailed in 
Japan for a long time. For this reason, many joint ventures in Japan ultimately 
fail." As these examples illustrate, companies may frequently need to consider 
the compatibility of partners' operating policies and procedures when 
considering formation of a venture. 
Be Aware of Potential Communication Barriers 
Communication is another potential problem area. By nature, .Ns tend to 
be fragile agreements, and communication problems make it even more difficuH 
for them to function as intended. Basically, such problems may occur as a result 
of differences between national or ethnic cultures, including language, as well as 
differing corporate cultures. Cultural differences can impede the development of 
rapport and understanding between partners. You should not overlook the 
importance of a partner with adequate English-language capability, or your firm's 
facility with the language of the partner. The simple ability to communicate with 
one's counterpart in the partner firm can often make a significant difference in a 
venture's prospects for success, and the absence of this ability has been the 
cause of more than a few disasters. 
Because of cultural or language differences, subtle nuanoes may be more 
difficult to communicate, thereby necessitating greater expenditures of time in 
negotiations and possibly delaying not only JV formation, but also major post-
formation decisions. The use of buzzwords common to many Industries tends to 
compound language problems. When buzzwords are used, misunderstandings 
can arise regarding each company's role in a joint venture. Especially in 
technology-oriented fields, commonly used terms may not have the same 
connotations for each partner. For example, specifications for the Boeing 767 
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jetliner called for fuselage panels to have a "mirror finish." Boeing's Japanese 
partners interpreted that specification too literally and engaged In excessive 
polishing efforts. As a result, the labor costs for the initial panels were excessive, 
necessitating further discussions to resolve the misunderstanding. Because of 
the risk of misinterpretations, it may often be advisable to attempt to substitute 
simple, .. Dick-and-Jane"-type terminology for technical jargon during 
negotiations and follow-up discussions. 
The existence of different cultural perspectives implies value systems that 
are not necessarily compatible; you cannot assume that promoting interests from 
one perspective will necessarily promote interests from another. However, 
managers should avoid the alternative assumption that different value systems 
will necessarily be incompatible. Values associated with different perspectives 
may be similar, even if only slightly, or they may be irrelevant to each other; it is 
not common for them to be in complete opposition. 
Prior experience suggests that language and culture tend not to be 
insurmountable barriers, particularly for partners from industrialized nations, 
although they can be an important handicap. Therefore, although cultural 
barriers are often considered when evaluating prospective partners, and 
especially when choosing between two otherwise equivalent partner prospects, 
they seldom function as the dominant selection criterion. 
Compatible Management Teams Help Reduce Problems 
It may be desirable to select a partner whose management team is 
compatible with one's own. Personal rapport between the principal deoision 
makers is often an important factor in the selection decision, and the inability of 
management to "take to each other" has frequently been cited as the basis for 
rejecting a prospective partner or for terminating a venture. Close personal 
relationships, particularly among the senior managers, helps to nurture the level 
of understanding necessary for a successful JV relationship. Managerial 
compatibility can enhance the partners' ability to achieve con census on critical 
policy decisions, as well as facilitating efforts to confront and overcome the 
frequent roadblocks encountered during joint venture formation and operation. 
Although building relationships between partners' managers takes time--a 
commodity many executives perceive to be in short supply when pursuing 
formation of a venture--it is an invaluable element of most successful JVs. This 
particularly characterizes ventures with Japanese firms, for whom establishment 
of close personal rapport is customarily a requirement before business 
negotiations can be concluded. 
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In many ways, it may seem unfortunate that JVs are so heavily dependent 
on personal rapport between a few individuals. Because of the informal nature 
of these relationships, including extensive utilization of unwritten "gentlemen's 
agreements," reliance upon executive rapport may lead to unnecessary disputes 
and conflicts of interests at a later date. To reduce the prospects of such turmoil, 
an additional consideration when selecting a partner may be the likelihood of 
continuity among the critical personnel within a partner's management team. 
Continuity among the principal managerial participants can help minimize the 
incidence of misunderstandings between partners. In this regard, several 
managers commented that Japanese executives had expressed hesitancy about 
forming JVs with U.S. companies, because the typically higher levels of 
management turnover in American firms hindered establishment and 
maintenance of close relations among the partners' managers. 
Trust and Commitment: Essential Elements of Long Term Relationships 
Forming and operating a successful joint venture may not be synonymous 
with the maintenance of friendly and cordial relationships between the partners• 
management teams. The perceived trustworthiness and commitment of a 
partner appears to have been a pivotal consideration when selecting many JV 
partners. Human chemistry is essential to the development and maintenance of 
trust and commitment, and interactions between management help provide the 
necessary foundation for their establishment. These interactions permit eaoh 
partner to gain a greater understanding of the people they will be working with, 
including their values, concerns, and needs, thus helping to assuage potential 
suspicions regarding a partner. One executive, noting the importance of mutual 
trust and commitment in the partner selection decision and the process for 
evaluating these traits, likened the process to a "mating dance.·· He visualized 
the prospective partners as cautiously approaching each other, trying to "strut 
their stuff" and create favorable impressions, engaging in an often lengthy ritual 
of evaluating the probability of mutual attraction and compatibility before either 
would oommit itself fully to the venture. Without full commitment by both parties, 
JVs tend to become only short term relationships, or "flings," often followed by 
divorce and parent-less "children." For this reason, great emphasis tends to be 
placed on the selection of partners which evidence trustworthiness and 
commitment to the venture, particularly by executives with more extensive JV 
experience. 
The need for trust and commitment between partners is especially critical 
if a proposed venture involves activities closely related to your firm's 
technological core. The technological core of many firms is the essence of their 
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corporate strategies and competitive advantage. A manager may 
understandably react with some level of initial distrust regarding potential 
partners' motives. It is useful to recall the inherent fragility of joint ventures when 
choosing partners, since today's partners could become tomorrow's 
competitors. As one CEO noted, "You've got to be sure that you're working with 
earnest and ethical people who aren't trying to undermine your company. 
Usually, a partner will have aooess to your trade secrets. He might attempt to 
complete a few projects, learn what you do, then exclude you from future deals." 
Baring your technological core to a partner who is not able to adequately 
protect this knowledge from technological then or bleed-through can threaten 
your company's competitiveness. As a result, an intuitive response may be to 
seek majority control, if not full ownership, of any venture, and then to hover over 
every decision the child might make--particularly if you do not trust a partner's 
intentions. Yet, such a response is unlikely to promote compatibility. 
Many managers take the position that, given the likelihood of some 
misunderstanding between the partners, the JV agreement should address every 
conceivable contingency. In contrast, managers experienced in JVs emphasize 
the building of mutual trust and understanding, which make the formal written 
agreement more a symbol of a commitment to cooperate than an actual working 
document. As one C. E. 0. commented, partners generally "don't start looking at 
the specifics of the venture agreement until the relationship starts breaking down 
and you're contemplating getting out." 
Regardless of protections written into the JV agreement, no legal 
document is fail-safe. "You can write all sorts of legal contracts and other formal 
agreements, but the partners must trust each other and be committed to the 
venture in order for it to work," noted an executive. "A partner may be able to 
muster a virtual battalion of lawyers, making it very expensive lor you to take a 
grievance to court, much less to win it." Therefore, you must be comfortable that 
the partner will honor the spirit, not just the letter, of the agreement. onen, 
particularly for ventures involving the Japanese, demands to develop extensive 
formal contracts dealing with every conceivable dispute will be viewed as 
evidence of mistrust. Managers are to be reminded that a JV relationship is 
delicate at best and complicated at worst, and without fundamental trust and 
commitment by each party there is little hope for a working partnership. 
Although the preceeding discussion presents what may appear to be a 
rather long list of criteria, managers with JV experience will probably be able to 
add others. Admittedly, these suggestions constitute an ideal set of conditions, 
and there may be few situations where each of these will be fully aohieved. 
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Nevertheless, the above provides a foundation for the identification and 
evaluation of potentially compatible JV partners. 
JOINT VENTURE SPONSORS 
In selecting JV partners, there are people from each company who play a 
particularly critical role in the process. Examination of prior ventures reveals that 
there are usually 1 to 3 key individuals, or sponsors, who are oritical to the 
partner selection decision and to efforts to implement a joint venture agreement. 
Typically, these individuals beoome involved very early in the selection process 
and occupy line, rather than staff, positions in the upper-middle to upper levels of 
the management hierarchy. 
The JV sponsors serve as catalysts for the process of identifying, 
evaluating, and negotiating with prospective partners. Because lley funotion as 
the driving force for the venture's formation, their continued involvement in the 
partner selection and JV formation process is essential. For this reason, the 
existence of more than one sponsor in each partner company may enhance 
prospects for successful JV formation. When a oompany has only one primary 
sponsor, loss of that individual--due to transfer, turnover, or other cause--
frequently either results in termination of formation efforts within a relatively short 
time period or significantly delays the negotiation process while relationships are 
established with the new sponsor. However, when more than one sponsor exists 
within a company, loss of one of them may create problems, but the process of 
forming and operating the JV is generally able to proceed with only minor 
delays. 
Because of their central role in the formation process and the broad range 
of activities which must be addressed, certain types of managers seem to be 
more effective as JV sponsors. In general, successful sponsors have been 
characterized by skills related to broader and more generalized line capabilities, 
rather than evidencing more narrow technical specialties such as law, 
accounting, or other support functions. In addition to their general management 
orientation, at least one of the sponsors from each partner oompany should also 
be fluent with the principal function(s) which the JV is expected to engage in, 
such as R&D, manufacturing, or marketing. When sponsors embody these traits, 
their ability to evaluate and negotiate with prospective partners is significantly 
enhanced. Yet, despite this caveat, a surprising number of firms have delegated 
responsibility for partner selection and negotiation to staff members, especially 
lawyers, who may be ill-equipped to function as full-fledged sponsors of the JV. 
As a result, they are often unable to effectively champion the venture, further 
hindering formation efforts. 
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INVOLVEMENT OF TOP MANAGEMENT IS CRUCIAL 
Especially for larger JVs and those accorded high strategic importance, 
top management of the company generally has some degree of direct 
participation in the partner selection process. These very senior level executives 
generally do not assume an active role as one of the key sponsors ohampioning 
the venture. Nevertheless, their participation is often pivotal in the successful 
formation and functioning of a JV, due to their ability to communicate the 
company's commitment to a prospective partner as well as to employees within 
their own firm. Top management involvement can help prevent or overcome 
deadlocks or other disagreements between the partners• operating-level 
personnel. Their participation also confers legitimacy to the proposed JV, 
helping to develop and sustain the commitment necessary to successfully 
complete the process of partner selection and JV formation. 
LOCATION OF THE PARTNER SELECTION DECISION 
The final decision regarding partner selection is almost always made at 
the corporate level, usually involving a vote of the board of directors. However, 
except for very large JVs and those which are very intimately related to a 
company's core business activities, the de lao/odeoisions regarding partner 
selection and venture formation are typically made by business unit or division 
level management, rather than at the corporate level. This fact further reinforces 
the importance of assigning extremely competent individuals to the JV task force, 
especially when those individuals are expected to function as the JV's sponsors. 
THE ON-GOING NATURE OF JV NEGOTIATIONS 
Managers should recognize that JVs are usually characterized by on-
going negotiations, even after the initial stages of discussions are concluded and 
the joint venture is formally established. This is true regardless of the absolute 
sharing of the venture's equity. Whether the equity is split equally or if one 
partner has a majority share, ooncensus is still desirable on major decisions. A 
minority partner consistently finding itself outvoted and relegated to sub-par 
performance is less likely to perceive that its strategic objectives are being 
attained. As a result, the probability that problems will arise is increased. 
It is inevitable that changes in the internal and external environment will 
occur. Under such circumstances, strict reliance on the initially negotiated 
contract may produce less than satisfactory performance for one or both of the 
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partners, thus threatening the venture's long term viability unless modifications 
are implemented. While not all aspects of a joint venture agreement may be 
subject to renegotiation, the principal impetus for re-opening discussions on 
some or all parts of the JV agreement is concern over potential inequities or 
domination. Since a balanced agreement is essential to the maintenance of 
trust, circumstances which produce perceived imbalances typically result in 
partner outcry and pressure for modifications to the agreement. To the extent 
that partners perceive incompatibilities between themselves and their venture 
mates and an inability to rectify the situation, what begins as a relatively minor 
annoyance may mushroom into a significant, and possibly fatal, souroe of 
friction. 
One means of minimizing problems within a joint venture is to maintain 
continuity among the key personnel. Because of their on-going relationship with 
their peers in the partner organization, they are a critical element in the 
maintenance of mutual trust. Personnel ohanges, especially among the venture's 
sponsors, can threaten the personal chemistry which has been built up between 
partners and necessitate further negotiations to re-establish this human balance. 
Although several firms have consciously exploited this tendency as a means of 
re-opening negotiations, be forewarned that such a strategy may also entail 
significant risks. 
AVOID ZERO-SUM GAME MENTALITY 
In the end, the partner selection decision is generally based on non-
quantifiable human judgment, especially the judgment of those individuals 
serving as the venture's sponsors. In this regard, managers should refrain from a 
tendency to approach negotiations as a zero-sum game. Because of the 
presumed long term nature of the relationship and the need for fostering mutual 
trust and commitment, attempting to "beat" the partner in the negotiation stage 
will generally prove dysfunctional in the long run. As one food industry executive 
stated, "'The content of any proposed agreement should be reasonable for all 
parties. If you believe it's reasonable, don•t hesitate to lobby strongly for it. 
However, it's useless to pursue an unreasonable agreement. Even if you're able 
to convince the partner to initially agree to it, he'll eventually feel cheated and the 
agreement will ultimately fail ... 
For some, the idea of cooperating with a partner appears to stand in 
direct opposition to a corporate value system holding self-sufficiency and 
aggressive competition as central ideals. Yet, regardless of the size or type of 
business, the JV must be founded and operated in the spirit of compromise and 
cooperation. A parent unwilling to recognize this principle should pursue other, 
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non-:-JV options, or it will find itself confronting constant difficulties. An 
inequitable agreement, unless remedied, can result in deadlocks or dissolution, 
causing the partners to suffer foregone opportunities, lost capital and other 
resources, and compromised proprietary information, as well as an enormous 
amount of stress and emotional anguish. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Joint ventures marrying corporate partners can be a valuable option for 
many firms and projects, and may be a less harrowing option than going it alone. 
But oaution is necessary when selecting a partner. It Is easy for companies to 
get married, yet if the courting ritual is not conducted in a thorough manner, a 
divorce is likely. The result--long and acrimonious legal battles, parent-less 
''children, •• and possibly serious soars for one or more of the partners--may 
place the companies in a worse position than was the case prior to entering the 
JV. 
Suooess or failure of a JV depends not only on a venture's l;nderlying 
strategic rationale, but also on how well partner companies oan W\ifk together, 
despite differences in management styles, strategies, resources, and culture. 
The effeot of such corporate chemistry is difficult to predict and control, but it is a 
critical consideration since JV agreements usually provide each partner witt• an 
on-going role in the venture's management. Compatibility of the partners, 
beyond mere teohnioal complementarity, is an important prerequisite for a 
suooessful corporate marriage. This is particularly important with regard to the 
selection of partners, due to the influence this decision may have on theN's 
performance. 
With regard to the identification of suitable partner prospects, analysis of 
past JVs suggests that there is no single approach which promises to provide 
optimal results in every situation. Rather, the method will be contingent upon the 
nature of the proposed investment. However, in developing criteria for selecting 
partners, it is essential that managers select a partner which offers strong 
prospects for developing an effective long term working relationship. Partners 
have a tendency to crystallize into personalities, of which some types may not be 
conducive to the venture's long term viability. Although satisfying the perceived 
technical requirements of ttte JV is a necessary element of the JV partner 
selection decision, it is generally not sufficient. It should be apparent that the 
partners, linked together, will form a complete business, both in terms of 
technical capabilities and in terms of their ability to suooessfully interact. 
Management of a joint venture is different from typical business activities, 
because it may involve a mixture of, and sometimes clashes between, different 
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cultures, thought patterns, and attitudes toward competition. There is a strong 
tendency for managers, particularly those without significant prior experience in 
JV formation, to view their prospective ventures as unique. This often translates 
into a perception that the JV experience of others has only limited applicability 
for their own circumstances. However, adamant assertions of the "uniqueness" 
of a particular JV may often be overstated. Although each situation will evidence 
unique elements, there do seem to be common elements in some, if not all, 
aspects of the joint venture formation process. For this reason, the process of 
locating suitable JV partners should, when possible, be carried out with the 
assistance of competent advisors who are thoroughly familiar with the law and 
business practices of the target industry and market. 
Because of the presumed long-term nature of most joint venture 
relationships and the costs associated with premature dissolution, there tend to 
be relatively high financial and human costs associated with the selection of 
partners for successful JVs. Firms must be willing to incur substantial search 
costs, including those associated with criteria development and partner 
identification and evaluation, as well as the extensive resource expenditures 
typically involved in the negotiation stage. In addition, the process needs to be 
approached with considerable patienoe and realistic expectations. If a company 
is unwilling to accept these preconditions, then it should probably consider other 
investment options, rather than trying to minimize resource expenditures by 
cutting corners on the quantity and quality of effort expended on the partner 
selection and evaluation process. 
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